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Miraculous Success? Inconsistency and Untruth in 
Kirchhoff’s Diffraction Theory1 
Juha Saatsi and Peter Vickers 
 
 
 
Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory is introduced as a new case study in the realism debate. The theory 
is extremely successful despite being both inconsistent and not even approximately true. Some 
habitual realist proclamations simply cannot be maintained in the face of Kirchhoff’s theory, as the 
realist is forced to acknowledge that theoretical success can in some circumstances be explained 
in terms other than truth. The idiosyncrasy (or otherwise) of Kirchhoff’s case is considered. 
 
The sole virtue of Kirchhoff’s theory of diffraction lies in its 
correct predictions and not in its false assumptions.  
(Andrews 1947, 784) 
 
1. Introduction. Scientific realists seek to establish a link between theoretical truth and 
predictive success, suitably understood. Different realist strands can be discerned by 
asking how theoretical truth on the one hand, and predictive success, on the other, are 
to be understood. What sort of link holds between the two? This paper introduces a new 
case-study pertinent to the above questions: we adduce some facets of Gustav 
Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory that call for a more nuanced treatment of the central 
connection between predictive success and truth. 
                                            
1 Forthcoming in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 
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Much realist ink has been spilt over the anti-realist challenge regarding the high level 
of predictive success of (what appear to be) grossly false theories. Ether theories of light 
have played a justifiably central role in the debate: their predictive triumphs are prima 
facie rather surprising by realist lights. We believe that realists got the upper-hand in this 
dispute some time ago; in the ensuing discussion the devil has been purely in the detail. 
For example, it has become apparent that surprisingly subtle manoeuvrings are required 
to properly draw out the correspondence that holds between Fresnel’s theorising and our 
current understanding of light, and there are still open questions about the most 
appropriate level of realist commitment in some other cases. But all this is relatively 
minor tinkering and disagreement within the realist camp, as most realists agree that 
there is a sense in which Fresnel’s success can be fully accounted for in terms of what 
Fresnel actually got right (by the present lights). Whichever streak of “selective realism” 
one prefers, arguably our best current theory says the very same things about the world 
in those relevant respects that are explanatory of the past theory’s success in the realist 
sense.2 For example—just to illustrate by mentioning one option—one might argue that 
the ether scenario on which Fresnel’s success is built instantiates exactly the same 
critical (higher-level) properties as the corresponding Maxwellian scenario (Saatsi 2005). 
Although we cannot take at face value Fresnel’s description of this scenario, ether and 
all, we can nevertheless take seriously the equations employed in his derivation. For 
those very same equations, minimally interpreted, describe the relevant properties of the 
electromagnetic field. 
                                            
2 Selective realism comes in many variants: structural realism (Worrall 1989), semi-realism 
(Chakravartty 1998), divide-et-impera (Psillos 1999), eclectic realism (Saatsi 2005). The whole 
stratagem has been accused of relying too much on hindsight (e.g. Stanford 2006). Although we 
believe that this accusation can be rebutted (cf. Saatsi forthcoming), we shall not tackle this 
contentious issue here.  
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Regardless of which brand of selective realism one settles on, the case-study 
introduced here is problematic since it doesn’t fit the required mould. The fact that 
Gustav Kirchhoff (1824–1887), like Fresnel, was operating in the ether paradigm is not 
problematic per se. By employing the ether-wave conception of light Kirchhoff (1882) 
derived a celebrated equation in the scalar diffraction theory of optics, describing the 
behaviour of light with remarkable accuracy. The predictive accuracy achieved is prima 
facie amazing for two reasons: it turns out that Kirchhoff’s derivation turns on crucial 
assumptions regarding the amplitude of light waves that (i) differ considerably from the 
actual situation (as described by Maxwell’s equations, for example) in various respects, 
and (ii) as a matter of fact are inconsistent. The selective realist cannot explain this 
success by pointing out the fact that ‘ether’ in Kirchhoff’s theorising referred to an idle 
metaphysical posit that didn’t play a role in the actual derivation. The problem simply is 
that there is no appropriate correspondence between Kirchhoff’s theory and our best 
current understanding of diffraction at the level of success-fuelling properties, “structure”, 
or whatever the selective realist might attempt to capitalise on. 
Kirchhoff’s feat has not gone unnoticed in the physics literature; quite the contrary—
physicists and mathematicians have carefully analysed Kirchhoff’s theory in order to 
understand what makes it tick. Examining the theory more closely yields an 
understanding of its success, but the case is fundamentally different from many other 
successful ether theories: the selective realist is led intolerably astray if she optimistically 
commits to those premises of Kirchhoff’s derivation that are responsible for its success. 
It is impossible to view Kirchhoff’s theory as approximately true in any reasonable sense, 
even if the derivation is construed in contemporary realist terms that ignore the 
assumption that the ether is the bearer of light waves. 
Kirchhoff’s case demonstrates how it is possible to derive highly accurate predictions 
from misguided and even inconsistent premises. This undermines a certain (implausibly) 
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strong form of realism, which we outline in the next section under the label “Naïve 
Optimism”. Thereafter in §3 we introduce Kirchhoff’s theory, before we highlight the 
specific details of the theory which act to undermine naïve optimism in §4. In §5 we 
consider the wider consequences for realism, and in particular for less naïve forms of 
realism. Any such form of realism must allow that sometimes the best explanation of 
success is not in terms of truth. We will argue that this need not entail the demise of 
realism, as long as Kirchhoff’s case can be viewed as having idiosyncratic features that 
do not generalise across the rest of science. §6 is the conclusion. 
 
2. The Naïve Optimist. Part of the debate between realists and anti-realists turns on 
how best to explain the success of a particular theory. Realists adhere to their intuition 
about the low likelihood (‘miracle’) of a (duly) successful theory that is not even 
approximately true. There are difficult questions to be answered about how the relevant 
likelihood should be conceived (Magnus and Callender 2004, Psillos 2006). We do not 
wish to engage in this debate here. Rather, we are concerned with the more specific 
question whether the realist should expect every instance of novel success to be 
explained by the truth content of the key theoretical assumptions. Let’s call those who 
answer this question in the affirmative naïve optimists.  
It is not clear why any realist would a priori deny the possibility of some actual 
predictive successes being explainable in terms other than truth. After all, the possibility 
of there being some such successes is not inconsistent with the realist credo that the 
best explanation of the success of science on the whole is that theories latch onto 
unobservable reality by and large. Although it is difficult to make this precise in 
probabilistic terms, the general thought is clear enough: there is no clear motivation for 
any realist to insist a priori on a connection between success and truth that allows no 
leeway whatsoever. Most realists, we believe, would concur. 
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Nevertheless, the Naïve Optimist position is not a complete strawman. For example, 
Leplin’s classic characterisation of realism included the clause ‘The (approximate) truth 
of a scientific theory is the only possible explanation of its predictive success’ (1984, 1, 
our emphasis). And Psillos and Ladyman carry this spirit on by effectively talking about 
the possibility of a counter-example to the realist's no-miracles argument: 
 
[A]t least some past theories which pass both realist tests of maturity and 
success are nevertheless considered false. […] If these theories are 
false, despite their being distinctly successful and mature, then the 
intended explanatory connection between empirical success and 
truthlikeness is still undermined.  (Psillos 1999, 108) 
 
Even if there are only one or two [problematic] cases, the realist's claim 
that approximate truth explains empirical success will no longer serve to 
establish realism. This is because, where a theory is empirically 
successful, but is not approximately true, we will need some other 
explanation. If this will do for some theories then it ought to do for all, and 
then we do not need the realist's preferred explanation that such theories 
are true. (Ladyman 2002, 244) 
 
Surely matters are not so clear-cut, however. It is quite conceivable that we might be 
able to explain the success of some particular theory T1 in such a way that we would not 
expect that kind of explanation to generally apply across the board. Understanding 
Kirchhoff’s success from the present-day perspective will provide an example of such 
explanation, and exploring this case will allow us to elaborate on this preliminary, purely 
conceptual point. 
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In order to be more precise, let us characterise the Naïve Optimist position as 
adhering to the following assumption: 
 
(NO) Any significant novel predictive success is explainable by the truth content of the 
assumptions (equations, models, structure, etc.) which play an essential role in 
the derivation yielding that success. 
 
Different realists have different ideas about how to best capture the essential truth 
content that can explain success in a 'non-miraculous' way. Naive optimism is clearly 
compatible with any realist position with respect to this separate issue. We can talk 
about a derivation being (explanatorily) approximately true, using the term 
'approximately true' broadly so as to include structural realism, say, which would only 
commit to truths about structure as the essential explanatory truth content.3 
There are some respects in which (NO) certainly isn’t naïve, but captures a relatively 
careful realist position. To begin with, such a realist is only willing to make her inference 
when there is evidence of novel predictive success, rather than mere explanatory 
success, or mere ad hoc accommodation of data, say. Furthermore, such a realist is 
focusing on the derivations that generate successes, rather than simply “theories”. The 
reason for this is twofold. First of all, the realist needs to recognise that a general 
theoretical framework often has excess baggage that in closer analysis plays no 
                                            
3  There are two informal senses to ‘approximate truth’ in the literature. First of all, we can talk 
about theories being approximately true in the (broad) sense that can incorporate the various 
selective realist manoeuvres (Saatsi, 2005). Secondly, we can talk about various individual 
assumptions of a theory being approximately true in the (narrow) sense that pertains to the 
numerical values of various quantitative properties, say. 
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essential part in generating a predictive success of interest.4 Secondly, the realist needs 
to recognise that it can be very difficult to say what a theory is, and what its role is in 
generating a success—as opposed to a set of specific modelling assumptions, say, that 
drive a derivation. It is better to focus directly on the derivation of a successful prediction 
and on the assumptions that go into that derivation; after all, the realist needs to explain 
how the outcome of that derivation does not indispensably depend on radically false 
assumptions about the world. Given such provisos, there is no need to avoid using the 
word ‘theory’, understood broadly as a set of assumptions about the world, required by a 
derivation, such that these assumptions are purportedly true about the system in 
question (and hence excluding manifest idealisations).5 
Although (NO) captures a careful realist position in some respects, the position is 
nevertheless naïve in the supposition that novel predictive success could not possibly be 
born of a derivation based on radically false assumptions. All derivations of novel 
predictive success are lumped together, without allowing that distinctions might need to 
be drawn between different cases. Included is the implicit assumption that we can infer 
approximate truth from predictive success without taking into account any particular 
features of the theory in question. That is, the connection between success and truth is 
not qualified by the domain of theorising in question, by the mathematics used in the 
derivation, by the nature of the system under theorising, or by anything of that ilk that 
might conceivably power success-production under some particular circumstances. 
Hence, according to Ladyman, for example, one can undermine the realist’s gambit by 
                                            
4 For example, only by studying the actual derivation of Fresnel’s equations will one find that, 
surprisingly, the wave aspect of the ether-wave theory of light played no essential role in the 
derivation. (Cf. Saatsi 2005) 
5 We will use ‘Kirchhoff’s theory’ and ‘Kirchhoff’s derivation’ (including the assumptions required 
for it) interchangeably, as is customary in the physics literature. 
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producing a single counterexample to the success-to-truth inference, with no regard to 
the potential idiosyncrasies of such an example.  
 
The case study that follows forces the Naïve Optimist to abandon her realism—unless 
she is willing to be less naïve, of course. We will argue that attending to the details of 
this case should lead the realist to qualify the connection between success and truth. 
 
3. Kirchhoff’s Theory. The naïve optimist’s position is to be tested in the face of 
Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory. Kirchhoff’s derivation of the Fresnel–Kirchhoff diffraction 
formula for the amplitude of light waves, U(P) 6 
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is relatively simple, yet mathematically rich in interesting ways (see Figure 1). 
Connection with observations is made by calculating from (1) the intensity of light as the 
amplitude squared ( I = U(P) 2). This predicts how light originating from a point 
source 0P , and passing through a small aperture in a flat, thin screen, will give rise to 
some intensity I  at a point P  on the other side of the screen. 
There is an essential bit of purely mathematical background to Kirchhoff’s success. 
Kirchhoff, a leading figure in the study of Green’s functions in connection with the wave 
equation, employed Green’s theorem and the time-independent (i.e. Helmholtz) wave 
equation to prove the central Helmholtz–Kirchhoff integral theorem: 
 
                                            
6 We follow Born & Wolf 1999, chapter 8. 
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Figure 1. Kirchhoff’s method of determining diffraction at an aperture. Obviously P0 is the source 
of the light, and P is the point beyond the screen at which we want to know the light intensity. In 
addition Q is a point in the aperture whose contribution we are considering at a given time, r is the 
distance from P0 to Q, s is the distance from Q to P. An imaginary surface of integration S is 
comprised of A (the aperture), B (part of the screen), and C (part of a circle of radius R which has 
P at its centre). n is a normal to the aperture, (n, r) is the angle between this normal and the line 
joining P0 to Q, and (n, s) is the angle between this normal and the line joining Q to P. (Figure 
taken from Born and Wolf 1999, p.421.) 
 
This formula expresses the scalar amplitude U  at a point P  in terms of the values of U  
and nU ∂∂  on any closed surface of integration S  drawn around P .7 This allows one to 
calculate the wave amplitude at a given point as a boundary value problem.  
                                            
7 Here s  is the distance from P  to the surface of integration, and n∂∂  denotes differentiation 
along the inward normal to S  (cf. Born & Wolf 1999, 417–419). 
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For the diffraction problem at hand this is not very useful by itself, of course, since 
the values of U  and nU ∂∂  are not known behind the screen. The Helmhotz–Kirchhoff 
theorem can be usefully applied to a variety of special cases, however. Our central point 
of interest, Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory, applies the mathematical theorem to the 
scenario depicted in figure 1, with a point-source 0P  sending out a monochromatic 
spherical wave. The closed surface of integration S  is chosen to comprise (a) the 
aperture A , (b) the non-illuminated side of the screen B , and (c) a portion C  of a large 
sphere of radius R , centred at P  (cf. figure 1). At the heart of Kirchhoff’s theory are the 
following three assumptions about the system: 
 
(A1) The field at the aperture A  is as if the screen did not exist; i.e. the screen 
does not perturb waves at the aperture.  
(A2) The field and its normal derivative vanish immediately behind the screen, i.e. 
a. 0=U  on B 
b. 0=∂∂ nU  on B. 
(A3) The contribution of the integral around C  vanishes as ∞→R  (‘Sommerfeld 
radiation condition’). 
 
As one can readily see from the form of equation (2), it follows immediately from these 
assumptions that the only contribution to the integral comes from the field at the aperture 
A . Assuming furthermore that the point source 0P  emits a spherical field 
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one straightforwardly derives the Fresnel–Kirchhoff diffraction formula (1). This formula 
is supremely accurate in predicting diffraction effects.8 It is still widely used in practice 
and discussed in the optics literature (Cf. e.g. Mielenz 2002, Li 2005, Bruce 2007). 
What should the naïve optimist’s attitude be in the face of Kirchhoff’s novel predictive 
success? The assumptions (A1)-(A3) above are absolutely vital to Kirchhoff’s derivation 
(they are certainly ‘working posits’) and they are also quite plausible intuitively speaking 
if one thinks of light as waves in the ether. The realist happily infers from all this that the 
key assumptions behind Kirchhoff’s derivation are most probably at least approximately 
true. In other words, Kirchhoff’s assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3) at least closely 
approximate the actual wave-amplitudes at the aperture and behind the opaque screen. 
For wouldn’t it be quite ‘miraculous’ if Kirchhoff’s assumptions were not even nearly 
true? The Naïve Optimist, in particular, is willing to stick her realist neck out as she 
proclaims that the approximate truth of (A1)–(A3) is the only explanation of Kirchhoff’s 
success that is consistent with realism. Were that really the case, realism would 
presently flop. 
 
4. Inconsistency and Untruth in Kirchhoff’s Theory. Like any non-fundamental 
theory, Kirchhoff’s incorporates various levels of approximation and idealisation, well 
documented in the literature. For example, as a scalar diffraction theory it ignores the 
vectorial nature of the electromagnetic field to begin with. But our claim that the theory is 
not even approximately true is not based on such small-scale idealisations. These are 
uninteresting compared with the ways in which the assumptions (A1) and (A2)—
                                            
8 In typical circumstances, that is: the aperture needs to be several wave lengths in width, and the 
inspection-point P   and the source-point 0P  need to be several wave lengths from the aperture, 
for example. 
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collectively known as Kirchhoff’s boundary conditions—misrepresent the behaviour of 
light. One would expect these not to be literally true, of course, on the basis that the 
edges of the aperture, however thin, are bound to perturb the field to some degree.9 
Such minor simplifications are unproblematic and insignificant, however, relative to the 
startling fact that Kirchhoff’s boundary conditions are (a) inconsistent altogether, and (b) 
wide of the mark regarding how light actually behaves at the aperture. 
Thus two puzzles present themselves: the ‘inconsistency puzzle’ and the ‘error-
tolerance puzzle’. It will turn out that only the latter presents a genuine challenge for the 
realist, but we will give a reasonably detailed account of the inconsistency of Kirchhoff’s 
assumptions since it is widely discussed in the optics literature, intrinsically interesting, 
and naturally leads to the puzzle about error-tolerance, as we will now see. 
 
4.1. The Inconsistency Puzzle. The inconsistency of Kirchhoff’s theory is much 
discussed in the earlier optics literature. The opening sentences of Heurtley (1973) 
capture the inconsistency puzzle: 
 
A problem of continuing interest in scalar diffraction theory is why the 
mathematically inconsistent theory of Kirchhoff predicts results that are in 
substantial agreement with experiment. (1003) 
 
The inconsistency manifests itself in various ways. Mathematically it is rooted in 
incorrectly over-determining the boundary conditions by fixing both U  and nU ∂∂ , when 
fixing either would uniquely determine the solution of the elliptic wave equation (see e.g. 
                                            
9 From the modern perspective this follows from the continuity conditions for Maxwell’s equations, 
but plausibility arguments can also be given in the elastic ether framework. 
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Barton 1989). Furthermore, it can be shown that fixing U  and nU ∂∂  to vanish over a 
finite line segment entails 0=U  across the whole plane (Sommerfeld 1954, 198). 
Another way to demonstrate the inconsistency is by using (1) to calculate U  and nU ∂∂  
as the observation point P  approaches the screen or the aperture: the boundary values 
assumed in the derivation of (1) are not recovered at the boundary (as already noted by 
Poincaré 1892, 187). 
One possible way scientists have attempted to solve this ‘puzzle’ is to find a theory 
which is a close relative of Kirchhoff’s but which is consistent. Obvious candidates arise 
in the form of the so-called Rayleigh–Sommerfeld (RS) diffraction theories.10 These 
theories are consistent by virtue of adhering to a proper subset of Kirchhoff’s over-
specified boundary conditions: regarding the field behind the screen only either (ii a) or 
(ii b) is assumed to hold, but not both simultaneously. These two alternative sets of 
boundary conditions yield two different equations that correspond to the Fresnel–
Kirchhoff diffraction formula (1)—the RS diffraction integrals: 
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10 In the optics literature it is customary to talk about the Rayleigh–Sommerfeld theory, which then 
has two solutions corresponding to two alternative boundary conditions. We prefer to speak of 
two RS theories, unified by a common mathematical framework, because one can identify two 
different (although partly overlapping) sets of physical assumptions. 
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Comparing these with the Fresnel–Kirchhoff diffraction formula at the limit λ>>r , 
λ>>s  shows that the field amplitude U  according to Kirchhoff’s theory is essentially 
equivalent to the two different predictions that come out from the consistent RS theories. 
For small angles of incidence and diffraction 1),(cos( ≈rn , )1),cos( −≈sn  we have 
 
UUU IIRSIRS ≈≈ .11 
 
Since the assumptions made by these two theories are proper subsets of the 
assumptions of Kirchhoff’s theory, one might hope that one or another of them keeps 
what is right about Kirchhoff’s theory and does away with what is false. At first it might 
even be supposed that this situation follows the pattern identified by Norton (1987, 2000, 
2002), where the success of an inconsistent theory is seen to be due to it incorporating a 
consistent “sub-theory”. But as a matter of fact Kirchhoff’s derivation does not get off the 
ground without both assumptions (ii a) and (ii b). There is no clear sense in which the RS 
theories would constitute sub-theories of Kirchhoff’s theory; the RS theories only work by 
giving derivations fundamentally different to Kirchhoff’s. At any rate, it isn’t clear that the 
realist would be happy with turning to these two theories, since as a matter of 
experimental fact Kirchhoff’s theory outperforms both Rayleigh–Sommerfeld theories in 
many circumstances. That is, in many circumstances the inconsistent theory is more 
accurate than the theories which are in a sense its nearest consistent alternatives, 
although the two mutually incompatible alternatives each hold sway over certain ranges 
of parameter values (Totzeck 1990). 
                                            
11 In fact, curiously enough, U  is an arithmetic average of the two RS theories: 
( )UUU IIRSIRS += 21 . 
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It is no wonder that physicists have been puzzled by these fascinating facts about 
Kirchhoff’s theory and its relationship to RS-theories. However, nothing yet said need 
overly perturb the realist. Even if she can’t straightforwardly turn to either of the RS 
theories as representing consistently what makes Kirchhoff’s theory tick, no reason has 
yet been given why she can’t maintain that the assumptions (A1)-(A3) are each 
approximately true. But things do become more awkward for the realist in the face of 
another theory which is a somewhat more distant relative: the Marchand-Wolf (MW) 
theory. 
Marchand and Wolf (1966) show that Kirchhoff’s diffraction formula (1) can be 
derived—exactly—from a consistent set of assumptions. Kirchhoff’s boundary conditions 
are modified by introducing an effect due to the “scattering” of light off the edges of the 
aperture. This systematically changes the amplitude and its normal derivative both at the 
aperture and behind the screen, and renders them quite different from what Kirchhoff 
assumed. Instead of an undisturbed “flat” wave across the aperture one finds a number 
of peaks and troughs of intensity as one moves across it (see Marchand and Wolf 1966, 
1716, fig.3(b)). It turns out that Marchand and Wolf come close to matching what we find 
when we work directly with Maxwell’s equations (see figure 2, below). 
Marchand and Wolf suggest that their theory explains the success of Kirchhoff’s 
theory in the face of its inconsistency: 
 
In the present paper we show that the inconsistency in Kirchhoff’s 
diffraction theory is only apparent (Marchand and Wolf 1966, 1713). 
 
And this attitude is found throughout the literature; for example Stamnes (1986) 
writes, 
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The consistency of the Kirchhoff diffraction theory was first demonstrated 
by Marchand and Wolf (1966). (27) 
 
Prima facie, these remarks are rather puzzling: the derivation of Kirchhoff’s formula 
makes essential use of boundary assumptions which are simply not recovered when the 
formula is evaluated at the boundary! But a more careful reading of the aforementioned 
authors indicates that the above claims can be put down to careless use of language 
and a different perspective on the inconsistency puzzle. These authors are happy to 
explain why Kirchhoff’s diffraction formula is so successful—namely, exactly the same 
formula springs from a consistent, well-motivated theory the assumptions of which may 
well represent the reality quite accurately. The realist, on the other hand, wants to 
explain why Kirchhoff’s theory is so successful and, if anything, MW theory presents a 
challenge for the realist by demonstrating how underdetermination can be realised in 
actual science. We have here two theories which make radically different assumptions 
about how light behaves in the aperture, but both of which can be used to derive the 
same diffraction formula! 
It should be made clear that the MW theory is strikingly different from the Kirchhoff 
theory. Marchand and Wolf’s assumptions about the scattering effects are nothing like 
Kirchhoff’s boundary assumptions (A1) and (A2). Thus the realist is faced with two quite 
different theories which are both equally successful. From that success she cannot 
possibly infer that the relevant assumptions in both theories are approximately true, 
because the respective sets of assumptions are simply too different. Furthermore, 
Marchand and Wolf’s assumptions about the scattering wave are independently 
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motivated by the contemporary understanding of diffraction, so they cannot be dismissed 
simply as post hoc.12 
Our best contemporary theory favours the MW boundary conditions over Kirchhoff’s, 
revealing (A1) and (A2) not to be even approximately true, and thus challenging the 
realist. But note that this challenge has nothing to do with consistency per se. The issue 
is no longer how an inconsistent theory can generate such success, but how a theory 
with seriously false assumptions can generate such success. The gravity of this problem 
will become clearer in the next section. 
 
4.2. The Error-Tolerance Puzzle. The central challenge for the realist is that the 
success-generating assumptions of Kirchhoff’s theory are wide of the mark. Here we 
provide further evidence for this claim. Since Maxwell’s identification of light as an 
electromagnetic phenomenon, correctly described by Maxwell’s equations, we have had 
the wherewithal to study diffraction from the first principles by imposing the correct 
electromagnetic boundary conditions over the edges of an aperture.13 The most serious 
problem for the realist is the discrepancy between what Maxwell’s equations tell us, on 
the one hand, and Kirchhoff’s assumption (A1) that the presence of the screen does not 
affect the field at the aperture, on the other. 
Brooker (2001) illustrates this by a model of an infinitely long slit of width a  in a 
screen of zero thickness and infinite conductivity. For such a system it can be shown 
that the amplitude of the E -field across the aperture varies as a function of the state of 
                                            
12 Marchand and Wolf draw on the work of Rubinowicz and others which started to attract serious 
attention from 1917 onwards. The assumption is made that diffraction is the combined effect of an 
incident wave and a scattered boundary wave (see Born and Wolf 1999, 499ff.). 
13 It should be noted, however, that computational intractability in the present scenario prevented 
scientists from working directly with Maxwell’s equations until advances in computing in the later 
twentieth century. 
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polarisation, and that there is a major departure from Kirchhoff’s assumption (A1) for 
light so polarized that its E -field is oriented along the slit. In this case the amplitude has 
a significantly fluctuating sinusoidal shape instead of being “flat” as assumed by 
Kirchhoff (cf. Figure 2). 
So from the perspective of Maxwell’s equations some of Kirchhoff’s key assumptions 
are not even approximately true. At the same time, however, diffraction effects 
calculated directly from Maxwell’s equations coincide with almost perfect accuracy with 
Kirchhoff’s predictions, regardless of the state of polarisation!  
 
Figure 2. Comparison of Kirchhoff’s assumption of a “flat” amplitude function across an aperture 
of width a with the amplitude function derived from Maxwell’s equations. (Adapted from Brooker 
2001, 71). 
 
This creates a genuine puzzle: as far as predictive accuracy is concerned, why does 
our wave-theoretic modelling of diffraction tolerate such significant errors with respect to 
the amplitude U  at the aperture? As Brooker remarks, 
 
Kirchhoff’s assumptions give a poor representation of the field in the 
plane of the slit, yet give a remarkably good approximation to the 
diffraction pattern. But—again we ask—why? (2003, 72) 
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With some ingenuity Brooker is able to provide an answer. Of all the possible ways in 
which Kirchhoff’s assumption (A1) differs from the truth (according to Maxwell’s 
equations), it just so happens that the difference has negligible effect. This has to do 
with the fact that as one moves across the aperture the difference between Kirchhoff’s 
assumption and the real amplitude is a close approximation to a sine wave with a period 
equal to the wavelength of the incident light. Brooker goes on to show that due to the 
nature of diffraction this particular error won’t show up in a final diffraction formula. Thus 
he concludes, 
 
[T]here are good reasons why we can get away with using Kirchhoff’s 
boundary conditions at a diffracting aperture. Nature has been unusually 
kind to us. (Ibid.) 
 
Of course Kirchhoff had no idea that an error of this kind would not show up in the 
final diffraction formula. If he were a realist, he would no doubt have taken the success 
of his derivation as strongly indicating that the difference between his boundary 
conditions and reality is negligible. But in fact the difference between his boundary 
conditions and reality is large, and the reason they can be used without engendering 
large error is something that was discovered only much later on. Note that it is not the 
case that Kirchhoff was playing with mathematics, trying many different ideas without 
any good physical reason, and that he hit upon a very successful formula by trial and 
error. This would perhaps be a natural way to explain why Kirchhoff’s “luck” was to be 
expected after all. But in fact he had a very plausible physical explanation behind the 
specific assumptions he made, an explanation which, in the end, turned out to be quite 
mistaken. This makes Kirchhoff’s success all the more remarkable. 
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5. Ramifications for Realism. How should the realist respond to Kirchhoff’s case? To 
begin with, it is clear that the Naïve Optimist must either renounce her realism, or 
become less optimistic about predictive success as an indicator of approximate truth. 
Kirchhoff’s theory functions as a “counter-example” par excellence against realism as 
construed by the Naïve Optimist, regardless of which of the contemporary selective 
realist positions she adopts. As a selective realist she may easily side-step the fact that 
Kirchhoff operated in the ether paradigm, and that Kirchhoff achieved success even 
though “ether” is a non-referring term. But such a realist cannot get around the fact that 
Kirchhoff‘s theory makes wildly wrong assumptions about the amplitude attributed to 
light waves at the aperture and behind the screen (regardless of what those waves are 
waves of). Even the structural realist---perhaps the most lightly committed breed of 
selective realism---can be challenged by Kirchhoff's theory. Given the nature of 
Kirchhoff’s wildly wrong assumptions there simply cannot be a natural structural 
correspondence between Kirchhoff's theory and Maxwell's theory, like the one we find in 
the Fresnel case. Neither is there a mathematical correspondence at some natural limit, 
like in the case of relativity and classical mechanics, say, that would allow the structural 
realist to explain Kirchhoff's success in a realist fashion. 
But what about less naïve forms of realism that wish to allow for such “exceptions 
which prove the rule”? How can they accommodate the above explanation of Kirchhoff’s 
success and yet retain their optimism for science in general? Let’s consider first the 
quick suggestion that the realist need not be bothered by this singular case-study, simply 
because this sort of underdetermination doesn’t occur with any significant frequency in 
science. One might assume that, given the vast literature on the realism debate, there 
cannot possibly be many other historical examples like Kirchhoff’s hiding in the 
woodwork. Hence, the suggestion is that perhaps in this case nature really has been 
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unusually kind to us, as Brooker puts it, and Kirchhoff’s success from falsity is just a one-
off. 
We are reluctant to make such an assumption, however. Philosophers of science 
operating in the realism debate have a tendency to write a great deal about a handful of 
case studies, leaving many stones of science unturned. So far philosophers have mainly 
focused on instances of radical theory-shift accompanied by ontological and referential 
change. It is worth stressing again that the ether aspect of Kirchhoff’s theorising does 
not play any role in our analysis. What matters is that Kirchhoff’s assumptions about the 
wave-amplitudes were so badly mistaken. To find examples of successful theories which 
are not even approximately true one does not need to look for cases of ontological and 
referential change. This increases dramatically the scope for finding potentially 
problematic cases. 
Simply appealing to the apparent rarity of such cases also fails to directly respond to 
the challenge posed to the Naïve Optimist. Since Kirchhoff’s success can be explained 
in this way, why not assume that a similar explanation may be available (although it may 
remain unknown to us) for many, or most cases?14 The appropriate response to this 
challenge turns on the details of the present case-study. It is telling that scientists 
themselves have explored and gained an understanding of Kirchhoff’s success from a 
firmly realist stance. By studying the nature of waves and diffraction further they have 
                                            
14 It seems that the realist can have some room for manoeuvre here, by accusing the challenger 
of having shifted the focus away from where it should be. That is, the realist can take her 
explanandum to be the success of science on the whole, and she may claim on various grounds 
that her explanans—“successful scientific theories are by and large approximately true”—still 
provides the best explanation of this explanandum, given our best understanding of science. 
Such a response would require much elaboration, of course, and some have worried that the 
whole debate is reduced to a fruitless disagreement about inaccessible statistical factors. 
(Magnus and Callender 2004). Although we remain unconvinced by this worry, here we want to 
focus on a different response. 
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discovered that the world of waves just is such that it creates a certain limited 
underdetermination that turned out to be rather auspicious for a scientist operating with a 
set of assumptions much simpler than the reality. Due to the nature of diffraction there is 
an interesting many-to-one mapping, so to speak, from amplitude-distribution-at-the-
aperture to diffraction patterns. We have discovered that the world in this specific 
respect is very kind to a human scientist who works her way upwards from the simplest 
assumptions. 
However, the fact that we have such underdetermination in the case of Kirchhoff’s 
theory need not mean that it is to be found everywhere. There is nothing in this case to 
indicate that the world gives rise to similar underdeterminations in the physics involved in 
analysing Brownian motion in terms of the atomic nature of matter or in our best theories 
involved in making inferences about the genetic nature of inheritance, say. A realist can 
insist that, in the present case study, the nature of diffraction and the mathematics 
employed are idiosyncratically fecund to this kind of underdetermination. In other words, 
the historical lesson learnt from Kirchhoff need not be widely generalisable. It is 
admittedly a difficult question how exactly to spell out this idiosyncrasy in general terms, 
and further work is needed here. But it should not be implausible to anyone that given 
the enormous variation in the nature and methods of scientific theories across the whole 
spectrum of “successful science”, some domains of enquiry can be more prone to this 
kind of underdetermination than others. And, witnessing Kirchhoff’s case, there is every 
reason to expect that from a realist stance we can grasp the features of physics and 
mathematics that contribute to such differences. The Naïve Optimist goes wrong in 
simply assuming that there are no such differences between theories and domains of 
theorising, as one “counter-example” from whichever field can stand as a proxy for the 
whole edifice of successful science. 
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6. Conclusion. Kirchhoff’s theory is the strongest single historical example against 
realism yet, and certainly seems to undermine Naïve Optimism. It is also the first case 
which gives realists a concrete reason not to be naïve: up until now every case put 
forward (e.g. those on Laudan’s list) can be and has been handled in ways compatible 
with Naïve Optimism. Now the realist must accept that sometimes a novel predictive 
success is explainable in terms other than underlying truth. But quite what is meant by 
“sometimes” is an open question.  
Still, the anti-realist cannot simply claim that because we have one such case we 
should infer that such cases abound. This is an example particular to one field, and it is 
not at all clear that it gives cause for wide-spread pessimism about realism more 
generally.  The anti-realist may claim that Kirchhoff’s predictive success is just like any 
other success the realist views as indicative of underlying theoretical truth. And since 
Kirchhoff’s success is not explainable in realist terms—the argument continues—we 
should not expect other predictive successes to be thus explainable either. We have 
argued that the realist should try to resist this line of thought by showing how the field of 
theorising in question is idiosyncratic in relevant respects, so that Kirchhoff’s curious 
case remains isolated and doesn’t provide the anti-realist with grounds for projectable 
pessimism. Whether or not this response can be made precise enough to convince the 
opponent is an open question that calls for further research. Here we have merely 
argued for the prima facie plausibility of such a response. 
On the other hand, the anti-realist might make something of the fact that this new 
case makes manifest a type of underdetermination which has not been given much 
attention in the literature: namely the possibility of equally successful theories which are 
different qualitatively and quantitatively, but not ontologically or referentially. But whether 
we should expect the type of underdetermination in question to crop up elsewhere in 
science is not at all clear. Kirchhoff’s theory may be the start of a newly invigorated case 
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against the realist, but by itself it does very little damage to a realist who is not naïve, in 
our sense. 
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